

# PirateShip: Distributed Consensus for (mostly) Trusted Execution Environments

---

**Shubham Mishra**, Amaury Chamayou, Natacha Crooks,  
Heidi Howard, Markus Kuppe




# Context: Distributed Trust Ledgers




# Consensus Protocols

## Crash Fault Tolerance (CFT)




- Must Trust your replicas:
  - Crash,
  - But strictly follow protocol.

## Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT)




- Replicas not trusted to follow protocol:
  - Arbitrary/malicious behaviour (for at most 1/3rd of nodes)

# Why not just use BFT, always?





# Why?

- $f$  more nodes.



- More phases! (at least 1 more than CFT protocols)



- Crypto overhead:
  - Signatures
  - MACs


# Is there a workaround?

Can we STOP malicious behavior from happening?!

## Trusted Execution Environments (TEE)



# TEEs to rescue



- Integrity

- Attestation proves to the operator that the code running in each replica is the intended one.

- Confidentiality

- Hardware protected keys.



Can get away with using cheap CFT protocols! (with some mods)

# Are we done?

## SGX-Step: A Practical Attack Framework for Pre-Enclave Execution Control

Jo Van Bulck  
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven  
jo.vanbulck@cs.kuleuven.be

Frank Piessens  
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven  
frank.piessens@cs.kuleuven.be

Raoul Strackx  
imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven  
raoul.strackx@cs.kuleuven.be

## Faults in Our Bus: Novel Bus Fault Attack to Break ARM TrustZone

Nimish Mishra, Anirban Chakraborty, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay  
Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur  
nimish.mishra@kgpian.iitkgp.ac.in, anirban.chakraborty@iitkgp.ac.in, debdeep@cse.iitkgp.ac.in

## FORESHADOW: Extracting the Keys to the Intel SGX Key Transient Out-of-Order Execution

Jo Van Bulck<sup>1</sup>, Marina Minkin<sup>2</sup>, Ofir Weisse<sup>3</sup>, Daniel Genkin<sup>3</sup>, Baris Kasikc  
Mark Silberstein<sup>2</sup>, Thomas F. Wenisch<sup>3</sup>, Yuval Yarom<sup>4</sup>, and Raoul

<sup>1</sup>imec-DistriNet, KU Leuven, <sup>2</sup>Technion, <sup>3</sup>University of Michigan, <sup>4</sup>University

## One Glitch to Rule Them All: Faulting AMD's Secure Encryption

Robert Bühren  
robert.buehren@sect.tu-berlin.de  
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT

Thilo Krachenfels  
tkrachenfels@sect.tu-berlin.de  
Technische Universität Berlin - SECT

## WESEE: Using Malicious #VC Interrupts to Break AMD SEV-SNP

Benedict Schlüter    Supraja Sridhara    Andrin Bertschi    Shweta Shinde


## SEVered: Subverting AMD's Virtual Machine Encryption

Mathias Morbitzer, Manuel Huber, Julian Horsch and Sascha Wessel

Fraunhofer AISEC  
Garching near Munich, Germany  
{firstname.lastname}@aisec.fraunhofer.de




# What is a realistic model for TEE faults?




CFT OK!

# What is a realistic model for TEE faults?




CFT still OK!

# What is a realistic model for TEE faults?




ALL nodes affected!  
Even BFT can't handle this


# Platform Fault Tolerance: The better model



# Timeline of a TEE platform failure



# Timeline of a TEE platform failure




# PirateShip goals

- **Security:** Gracefully handle malicious TEEs/platforms.
  - Quickly check/reconcile logs.
  - Seamless; no external intervention.
  
- **Performance:** Keep overheads wrt CFT as low as possible.

# Performance vs Security

**Crash Commit**  
*for lower latency*

**Byz Commit**  
*for better security*







Key Idea:

Embedding asynchronous BFT logic inside CFT protocol  
*without sending extra messages*

# How?

## Key Insight:


### CFT and BFT protocols are not THAT different!



# How?

- Pipelining
- Hash-chaining
- Asynchronous vote counting

# Initial Results



# Conclusion

- We present the notion of Platform Fault Tolerance to better model TEE-based distributed ledgers.
- We presented PirateShip, a new consensus protocol for TEEs that exhibits CFT-like performance but asynchronously provides BFT guarantees.

## Thank you!

Questions?

[shubham\\_mishra@berkeley.edu](mailto:shubham_mishra@berkeley.edu)